The final rebellion of Donald Dubh, heir to the forfeited MacDonald lordship of the Isles, is usually examined within the context of Highland rebellions that occurred in the half century after forfeiture. The factors that motivated the Islesmen to rise in rebellion in 1545 were, however, multi-faceted and can only be fully understood by placing the rising in a wider context, which considers national and archipelagic events. The discussion that follows explores the reasons why the Islesmen, almost unanimously, entered into agreement with Henry VIII to attack Scotland from the west and why this endeavour failed. At the same time, the article highlights Henry's recognition of the strategic importance of the west which led him into alliance with Donald Dubh and his supporters.
of John MacDonald, fourth lord of the Isles, who had been forfeited in 1493. Apart from a brief spell in the opening years of the sixteenth century, when he was involved in a rebellion alongside his uncle, Torquil MacLeod of Lewis, Donald spent most of his life in captivity. 3 His release, shortly after James V's death, coincided with several other events which precipitated the rebellion of 1545.
Most discussions of these early sixteenth-century rebellions suggest that they aimed at lordship restoration. But the rebellions were complicated events in which several motives coalesced, none more so than in 1545. On the part of Donald Dubh, self-interest was paramount. He stood to regain the lands and lordship held by his grandfather, John, lord of the Isles. He also was offered English gold and military support to take revenge on the Gordons of Huntly and the Campbells of Argyll -two of the leading magnate families in Scotland -who had responsibility for law and order in the Highlands. The motives of other chiefs within the former lordship are, however, less certain. They stood to lose legal title to former lordship lands which they had received after 1493. James IV's grants and re-grants of land following the forfeiture had in some cases heightend rivalries within the former lordship. By 1545 some of these tensions still lingered, such as the dispute between the MacDonalds and MacLeods over Trotternish, in Skye, but in general it is doubtful that land disputes prompted rebellion. 4 But did other chiefs, like Donald Dubh, also hope to restore the lordship?
Aside from the issue of the lordship, discussion of the rebellions has generally focused on their wider Scottish context. The cycle of rebellion and forfeiture fits into a wider historiographical narrative concerning the efforts of successive Stuart monarchs, from the late fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries, to deal with their lawless and disorderly subjects in the Highlands and Islands. Moreover, successive Stewart monarchs had sought to maximise royal revenue from rents and taxes imposed on a region regarded as profitable. 5 Just as financial considerations had been a significant factor in James III's forfeiture of the earldom of Ross in 1475, so too finance was a major concern of the 1540 Act of Annexation, which stated that:
with the earls of Lennox and Ormond, along with the force of about 2,000 men from Ireland, plus an additional 300 mariners to man the ships. Donald Dubh had promised a force of 8,000 men and a fleet of 180 galleys (according to the council of Ireland). Thus, the total force could be estimated at around 10,000 men and 200 vessels. By comparison, in 1745 Charles Edward Stuart, the descendant of the Stuart royal line, arrived in Scotland with the support of Irish Jacobites but only two vessels, from France, one of which had to return having being damaged in an encounter with an English ship. When his army reached Edinburgh its ranks had swelled to 7,287 infantry and 300 horse. 13 While there are limitations to the validity of the comparisons that can be drawn between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the size of the two forces, and their military potential, were not dissimilar. Of course, the Jacobite army reached Derby and gained support in England and Ireland, thus transforming its historiographical reputation from the localised status which the 1545 rebellion has never escaped, even although it too should be interpreted in an archipelagic context.
The rebellion of 1545 was a by-product of Henry's efforts to force the Scots into accepting dynastic union with England. He sought to use armed forces from Scotland and his newly created kingdom of Ireland to support the English army already attacking Scotland from the south and east. James V had died in December 1542, shortly after the Scottish defeat at Solway Moss. He left a six-day old heir, Mary, thus creating an unexpected opportunity for Henry to forge union through the marriage of Mary to his son, Edward Tudor. In Scotland the royal minority and the religious factionalism that accompanied Henry's break with Rome brought about divisions that were exacerbated by the proposed dynastic union which would arise with the marriage of Mary Stewart to Edward Tudor. James Hamilton, second earl of Arran and heir presumptive to the throne, was a key figure in the minority administration. He supported dynastic union with England despite opposition from a procatholic and pro-French faction led by Cardinal David Beaton and Mary of Guise, widow of James V. Arran moved quickly to negotiate the marriage but the treaties of Greenwich, agreed on 1 July 1543, were denounced when presented to the Scottish parliament for ratification in December, by when Arran had realigned himself with Guise and Beaton.
14 Henry then began his so-called 'rough wooing' of Scotland, intended to force the Scots into accepting dynastic union.
In the face of this onslaught the French provided assistance to the Scots. Mary of Guise, widow of James V, was a key figure in the 12 prospects lay with an English king keen to find allies amongst the lords of western and southern Scotland, who in turn might rebel in his support. The Lennox estates were situated in the west of Scotland, around Loch Lomond; and the earl was also keeper of Dumbarton Castle. The castle was of enormous strategic importance and dominated the Clyde, the gateway to the west. 21 Henry's naval forces could reach friendly soil and their invasion could cut Scotland in half, from Dumbarton in the west to Broughty Ferry in the east. 22 The French were equally aware of the strategic importance of the west coast. As de la Brosse pointed out to Mary of Guise and the Cardinal in 1543: the castle of Dumbarton was almost impregnable and . . . if the Earl of Lennox wished to hand it over to the King of England, the realm of Scotland would run the grave danger of being utterly lost, because the sea would be open to him [the King of England] to enter with his ships without any opposition and in such numbers as he wishes. And once landed he would be invincible unless a pitched battle were offered or famine ensued. 23 For Henry, the advantages of an alliance with Lennox were obvious but the strategy was not without problem. The prevailing winds and tidal currents in the west meant that the route from England to Scotland via the east coast was much faster and less hazardous than that through the Irish Sea. 24 The Irish Sea is a unique stretch of water with its own tidal regime, a result of the waters of the Atlantic entering the sea from both north and south. In the North Channel the Atlantic tides are forced into the narrow passage between Torr Head in Antrim and Kintyre in Argyll, making for strong tidal streams which can reach five knots. The streams are at their weakest between the Isle of Man and St John's Point on the Irish coast where, one-third of the way south through the Irish Sea, the tides from the north meet the Atlantic waters entering from the south. These waters extend much further into the Irish Sea because St George's Channel is three times broader than the North Channel. Thus, even with 'fair winds, a day's sail from south to north . . . will be delayed by meeting an opposing tide at some point in the passage.' 28 In short, when relying on sail alone, even in favourable weather conditions, a journey through the Irish Sea would take longer than its distance would suggest. Indeed, the state papers are littered with references to delays in the passage to and from Ireland because of 'contrary winds'. 29 For various reasons, therefore, the English regarded the Irish Sea as a security risk. Tudor monarchs often feared invasion from the west because France or Spain could use Ireland as a launch-pad for attack. 30 Likewise, James IV had been aware of the need to provide greater security around western coasts, especially in the wake of the 1493 forfeiture and the unrest that followed. He commenced a programme of ship building and repair work at Dumbarton in the winter of 1494-5 and in the following years he established royal garrisons and fortifications around the coast, at, for instance, Kilkerran, Tarbert and Ailsa Craig. 31 Argyll was married to Lady Helen Hamilton, daughter of the first earl of Arran and half-sister to the regent. Henry tried to pitch blood against marital kinship and Hugh Campbell of Loudoun, sheriff of Ayr, was enlisted to persuade Argyll of the benefits of an English alliance.
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With the prospect of Anglo-Scottish hostility looming, Loudoun argued that 'inclyning to [Henry's] . . . devocion, maye have noo small ayde . . . if incase they of the Ile shall chaunce to rebel' because the king had 'Irelande in suche subjection . . . whiche maye ayde hym at all tymes'. 36 Henry sent 1,000 crowns to Loudon, to be offered as an annual pension to Argyll, while the earls of Huntly and Moray were also to be approached for an accommodation. 37 Argyll did not take the bait. On 8 March 1544 Hertford asked Henry for 'x or xii shipps well eskypped and furnished, by the west sees, to do some annoyance to thErll of Argile'.
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Argyll's rejection of English overtures was not simply a sign of loyalty to his wife's kindred, the Hamiltons. In the fifteenth century the Campbells and the MacDonalds had co-existed largely harmoniously and, although Campbell influence in the west had grown, this had not 31 brought the families into significant conflict.
39 Donald Dubh had spent the early years of his life in the first earl of Argyll's custody at Innis Chonnell. Traditionally this has been interpreted as an 'imprisonment' but Argyll had not simply acted as a royal agent. 40 Although the crown had relied heavily upon Argyll to suppress the early risings in the Isles, the earl displayed reluctance to take firm action, preferring negotiation rather than force in his dealings with the Islesmen. 41 Moreover, while the crown took decisive action against the MacDonalds, successive earls built up ties with former lordship clans. Colin, third earl, collaborated with Lauchlan MacLean of Duart and Alexander MacLeod of Dunvegan in seeking to resolve the 1517 rebellion. 42 At the same time connections between the Campbells and other clans were reinforced. 43 The first signs of MacDonald resentment towards the Campbells are only visible in 1529, when Alexander MacDonald of Dunivaig rebelled, and even this has been interpreted as merely a personal dispute about the MacIan inheritance. 44 Nevertheless, in the wake of the rebellion, James V worked closely with MacDonald and Hector MacLean of Duart during the 1530s, deliberately keeping Argyll out of the west, a move which further questions the dominant historiography of Clan Donald's demise and Clan Campbell's rise. 45 Nevertheless, by the time of James V's death Argyll had been rehabilitated into the political elite and, by taking his place in the minority government, the earl arguably saw his role as defender of Scottish, rather than local, regional or personal interests.
If Argyll's stance caused Henry frustration, a solution soon emerged. In January 1544 Lennox completed his volte-face and initiated negotiations with the English king. Lennox now sided with the pro-English, pro-union lords of the south-west, including Archibald Douglas, sixth earl of Angus, William Cunningham, third earl of Glencairn, and Gilbert Kennedy, third earl of Cassillis. Crucially for Henry, Lennox and his allies could provide much needed armed power 39 Colin, first earl, and Archibald, second earl, were appointed to positions within the government while vsed, orderide, and dealide with the lordes of Irland, ther nyghboures . . . perdonyng and forgiving theame ther offences and trespasses; creating of them, some erlis, some lordes, and some barons; rewarding theame more like princis then erlis and lordis, with gold, siluer, and riches; and sending theame home agane with gorgeous indumentis, and rich apparell. 47 While asserting the loyalty of the Highlanders to the English king, Elder was, however, careful not to portray either himself or the Highlanders as disloyal subjects of the Scottish crown. He argued that if James V were still alive or had left 'a Prynce lawfully begotten of his body' then he 'wolde in no manner of wise presume to shaw and declair the privities of Scotlande to no Prynce Christen'. In other words, the absence of an adult monarch, combined with the 'miserable estate' that had resulted from the minority government's association with 'proud papisticall buschops', had pushed Elder and the Islesmen towards Henry. By disassociating the Islesmen from treason Elder was deploying a familiar tactic in Scotland. Minority government was something to which Scots were accustomed and disgruntled nobles often took the opportunity presented by a minority to make good losses incurred under the previous regime. Thus, rebellion was not directed against the crown, but rather against the ruling administration. Indeed, while the former lordship clans did not relish greater crown intervention, this was significantly more preferable than governmental intrusion by a relatively weak and divided administration. As Gregory argued, James V's death exposed the Highlands and Isles to 'domestic feuds between the powerful factions' at the heart of the minority government, whereas James V's adult reign had 'promised an assurance of a more lengthened period of repose than the Isles had hitherto enjoyed'. It has been argued that Elder's protestant outlook explains his desire that the 'realms of England and of Scotlande may be joined in one' with Henry as 'superioure and kynge'. 50 If so, Elder managed to intertwine his own views with the rather different motives of the Islesmen. For Elder their antagonism towards Argyll was because the earl was 'novrisshed and brought vp' by Cardinal Beaton and the bishops. 51 Yet, one modern assessment reckoned that for the Islesmen 'religion ostensibly was not a factor'.
52 Instead, the rent increases which followed the Act of Annexation caused resentment. So too had increased intervention in the region by the crown's agents, the Campbells and the Gordons. And perhaps too restoration of the lordship stimulated discontent. In negotiations with Henry, Donald was referred to as 'Lord of ye Ilis and Erll of Roiss', harking back to an era when the lordship was at its fullest extent, while the rebellion of 1545 was supported enthusiastically by former lordship clans. 53 Of course, the reason for the Islesmen's discontent was probably not of any great interest to Henry. It did matter that many Islesmen had been alienated by James V and the minority administration; and that the malcontents were potential allies.
It acquisition of geographical knowledge about Scotland while he planned for its invasion. 56 Before the mid-sixteenth century most of England's navigational tracts were translations of continental manuscripts. Most maps were also of foreign origin. 57 Although the best map-makers were Flemish, protestant French cosmographers and navigators had sought refuge in England and many found ready employment at Henry's court, where their knowledge was exploited eagerly. It has been suggested that by the end of his reign as many as sixty French mariners and pilots were in Henry's service. 58 Unfortunately for the king, French cartographical knowledge of Scotland was focused primarily upon the east coast. Familiarity with the Irish Sea -awareness of its tides, currents and military potential -resided instead with the Islesmen. Although the English possessed galleys and pinnaces, their larger sailing vessels, constructed according to continental models, found the waters of the Irish Sea difficult to navigate. The Highland galley, or birlinn, descended from the Viking longship, was much more reliable and manoeuvrable in these waters. Clinker-built, preferably from oak, with a sharp stem and stern, a single mast and a rear or stern-rudder, such vessels had both oars and a square sail and were perfectly suited to the tide and weather conditions of the Irish Sea. The shallow draught allowed for easy manoeuvrability in sheltered coastal areas, inland rivers and sea lochs; but it was simultaneously deep enough to allow for safe crossing of a short but turbulent body of water. The combination of sail and oar was the key to successful raiding: in favourable weather sail was effective but the ability to revert to oar for a quick get-away, should conditions change, was highly advantageous.
Clan chiefs maintained their own birlinns and galleys, a source of strength that successive Scottish monarchs had sought to exploit for their own ends from as early as the time of Robert I (1306-29). 59 Similarly, for many lords of Ayrshire and Galloway naval strength was of immense importance for commerce, fishing and defence. 60 It is little wonder that external powers now courted men with such significant maritime power.
Care should be taken not to distinguish too greatly between Highlanders, Islesmen and south-western lords with whom Lennox also had close ties. 61 Gaelic was spoken across a region stretching as far as Ireland which was bound by water and the communication which it facilitated. 62 Lennox, his south-western allies and others too possessed estates that straddled what became known as the HighlandLowland divide. With both Gaelic and non-Gaelic tenants, landlords would have moved easily between the two areas. 63 Moreover, both the Campbells and the MacDonalds maintained close connections with Ayrshire and Galloway families. 64 Before 1493 the lords of the Isles held the lands of Greenan, in Ayrshire, where their main tenants were the Davidsons. 65 The main line of Campbells had marital connections with the Montgomery family; 66 and in 1536 Elizabeth, daughter of John Campbell of West Loudoun, married William Cunningham, third earl of Glencairn. 67 The third earl had risen to prominence because of his service in the west, which had included acting as the king's commissioner and surveyor of crown lands in Kintyre in the early 1540s. Others performed similar service: Archibald Stewart of Bute was, for example, made captain of the castle of Dunivaig on Islay. 68 In March 1544 Lennox, Angus, Cassillis and Glencairn sent commissioners to treat at Carlisle with Thomas, first Baron Wharton, and Sir Robert Bowes, commissioners appointed by Henry VIII. 69 Before agreement was reached Henry acquired 'cause to be dissuaded': Angus was not to be included because of his 'manifest appearance of untruth' and Cassillis had switched sides, returning to Arran's fold. 70 Lennox and Glencairn remained, however, useful. On 17 May 1544 they acknowledged Henry as 'King Director and Protector of Scotland'; 71 and on 28 May, leaving Glencairn at Dumbarton, Lennox sailed to London where the agreement reached at Carlisle was formalised on 26 June. 72 In addition, Lennox agreed to deliver Dumbarton Castle, Rothesay Castle and the isle of Bute to the English king, and to serve Henry 'as his subject, against all who impugn his right, title and authority in Scotland or offend him in any dominions in his possession, or to which he has any title'. In return Henry granted Lennox the marriage of Margaret Douglas, the king's niece, and agreed that when he gained 'the direction and rule of Scotland' Lennox would be appointed governor. 73 On 29 June the marriage took place at St James's Palace and on 10 July Lennox became an English subject. 74 Later in July 1544 henry equipped Lennox with sixteen ships and 600 soldiers for an expedition to secure the Dumbarton garrison. Lennox took Rothesay Castle on Bute before reaching Dumbarton although securing his own castle was not straightforward. While Lennox had been in England Mary of Guise had won Glencairn over and plans were laid to take Lennox prisoner when he returned. On arrival Lennox became suspicious and withdrew before he could be apprehended. 75 Although unable to take the castle he did not leave Gerald, the remaining heir to the forfeited Kildare earldom in Ireland, had been sent to France a few years earlier for his safety following the failure of the Geraldine rebellion and the subsequent execution of all those involved. 93 In response to the rumours St Leger asked the king for ships to defend the waters of the north of Ireland against both the French and the Islesmen. The fear was of Irish rebellion, led by the exiled heir to the forfeited Kildare earldom, supported by Islesmen, led by the heir to the forfeited lordship of the Isles. An attack of this magnitude might have proven fatal to Henry's ambitions, not least since he had lost the support of the lords of the south-west.
These concerns were alleviated by the arrival at court of Patrick MacLean, a messenger dispatched from 'the Lord of the Isles'. MacLean had been initially sent to Lennox, since December 1544 in Carlisle, where he could 'more advance our affairs . . . to practise with the Scots . . . "sow devision amonge them'' or at least to get intelligence'. 94 After discussion with Lennox, MacLean headed south. It was, therefore, in early 1545 that direct communication between Henry and the Islesmen commenced. On 12 March Henry told Lennox to do 'anything for the advancement of the King's affairs,' sending 800 crowns as a reward for Donald although it was left to Lennox's discretion when the money should be delivered. 95 In the interim, waiting for a response from the English king, Donald agreed to a truce with Argyll and Huntly, to last until 1 May 1545, and he even promised to visit the queen at Stirling. 96 On discovering this, the English expressed concern and Lennox was advised on 27 March not to hand over the 800 crowns until sure that Donald would 'remayne firme and constant' in his alliance with Henry. 97 Shortly after reports reached London that the truce had expired and that Argyll and Donald Dubh were both preparing to attack each other. 98 As well as preparing to harry the lands of Argyll and Huntly, Donald had been cultivating his connections with Hugh O'Neill, head of the mighty Tyrone kindred, as a means of demonstrating his loyalty to the English. On 6 May St Leger informed the council in London that: the earl of Tyrone, being now at Dublin, declares that McConell has desired him to petition the King to accept him to his service. Tyrone says that McConell is mortal enemy to the earl of Argyle . . . [who] since the king's death is enlarged and grown to great power'.
While the Islesmen may have caused problems for Argyll and Huntly in recent months, this is the first specific indication of MacDonald resentment towards Argyll. Donald singled the earl out as an enemy, along with 'all that were friends to the Scottish king that dead is'. This statement harks back to John Elder's letter which emphasised that the Islesmen were not disloyal to the Scottish crown but rather to the ruling administration. They were loyal to monarchical authority -but since James V was dead, they now looked to Henry.
Negotiations progressed rapidly. On 28 July 1545 a commission was drawn up at 'Ellencarne', the island in Loch Ballygrant on Islay, in which Donald Dubh, styled 'Lord of ye Ilis and Erll of Roiss', elected two plenipotentiaries to negotiate with Henry.
100 The commission was subscribed by all the island chiefs except James MacDonald of Dunivaig and Torquil MacNeill of Gigha. Torquil was an old man and his absence and that of his, Niall, is often overlooked. 101 MacDonald's brother, Angus, was present and is usually regarded as a proxy for James. This should not be accepted without question. Angus and James grew up separately and Angus may have joined the rebellion regardless of his brother's opposition or neutrality. James had been brought up at court and was married to Agnes Campbell, Argyll's sister. James had sought security of his Scottish lands through his marital connections but his younger sibling sought to obtain title from Henry for his lands in the Glens of Antrim. While the two brothers had a similar aim, that of securing title to land, they were working to very different agenda, a possible pre-cursor to the split in the clan that would occur later in the sixteenth century.
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By early August 1545 the island chiefs, with a force of 4,000 Scots, were at Carrickfergus on the east Antrim coast, a place 'more propice for them to serve the King against the Scots than any port in their own land'. 103 Here they swore an oath of allegiance to Henry and honed the finer details of the agreement. Throughout the negotiations the Islesmen added legitimacy to their cause by consistently referring to Lennox as 'true governor' and 'second person' of Scotland, thereby attempting to discredit the ruling administration. 104 In addition, Donald Dubh and the Islesmen agreed to support the marriage of Mary and Edward and to keep Argyll and Huntly militarily engaged. This would be achieved through the provision of a force of 8,000 Scotsmen, half at Carrickfergus while the remainder kept watch on events in Scotland. Henry would assist by sending 2,000 kerne and galloglass under leadership of the earl of Ormond. 106 Their objective in Scotland 'besides generall annoyances to be doon in burning herieng and spoiling' was 'thannoyaunce of the said Erll of Argiles countrey'. 107 In addition, Lennox was to be furnished with a cannon, artillery and munitions, while 3,000 of the Scots forces were to receive a wage for two months. 108 This was easier said than done. Despite Henry's orders, the Irish council in Dublin was in no position to carry his instructions out. It continually requested money from England with which to pay the Scots and early in October 1545, with Lennox on his way to Ireland to join the expedition, the council stated that it was not ready to provide men, ships, arms, or money. 109 In future it requested 'longer notice of the king's wish to use the service of Irishmen whose captains must keep their countries furnished with men against the neighbours, for this land is not like England'. 110 The delay in assembling the provisions and force from Ireland was too great for the Islesmen who returned to Scotland to await the arrival of Lennox and the Irish. They were wary of lengthy absence from Scotland and anxious to protect their own lands. But the unity of the Islesmen was under threat too. Henry's payments had not been distributed 'to the satisfaction of all' and following disagreement the force disbanded.
111 Lennox finally arrived in Ireland on 10 October 1545 by when the Islesmen had returned home. 112 Lennox wrote to Donald Dubh, telling him to prepare for rebellion, but it was not until 15 November that, accompanied by Ormond and the force of 400 with the earl and for him to be sent to Ireland. 121 Lennox still had an important intermediary role between the Islesmen and Henry. But while significant, his absence was not the only reason for the failure to amalgamate the force of Irish and Scots. Donald Dubh too was unable to maintain unity among the Islesmen. The kerne and gallowglass who were to join the Islesmen were to be chosen 'out of the "most wild and savage sort'' . . . whose absence should do good rather than hurt '. 122 Assembling this army at short notice proved difficult and, as St Leger informed the English privy council, the 'journey into Scotland is strange to the men of this land'; it was compounded by 'the bruit of slaying of their countrymen in the late conflict on the Borders of Scotland'. 123 Irish troops had been sent to the Borders previously, in 1544, and although Hertford initially regarded them as 'unrewly and farr out of good order' he subsequently commended their 'good service in this journey'. 124 He noted also that the Irish had 'moche dred of the Scottes' and disliked their custom of killing enemies rather than taking them prisoner. 125 This reluctance of the Irish to fight alongside Donald Dubh, in alliance with Henry against the Scots and Argyll, is intriguing. Several Scottish clans, notably the MacDonalds, MacLeans and Campbells, maintained Irish ties. Perhaps Argyll (and/or James MacDonald of Dunivaig), exercised greater leverage over the galloglass than Donald Dubh.
126 It is also possible that Irish reluctance was ideological (since many Irish continued to oppose Tudor authority in Ireland) or that it was simply an expression of reluctance to leave home. Payment of wages may have enticed many to serve in the Borders but reports filtering back of inadequate food supplies would have been a very real disincentive to further engagement. Irish lords, of course, also needed to maintain a fighting force on their own lands.
Absence from home was not something that the Islesmen too would long tolerate. Given the war with England and widespread unrest in the west Highlands and Isles, delays at Carrickfergus were not ideal. For the Islesmen wages were also a thorny issue. 128 Thus, Highlanders and Islesmen had a long record of fighting in the wars of the native Irish but they did not do so without pay. Although Henry had promised wages for 3,000 men for two months, the Islesmen had already spent one month at Carrickfergus before returning home. It is difficult to corroborate the claim that they disbanded because of internal squabbles over the distribution of the English money but it is clear that money was a factor. During the negotiations between Henry and Donald Dubh the issue of financial payment loomed large. 129 Aggrieved by recent rent increases, the Islesmen were not in a position to maintain themselves for a sustained absence from home. The Islesmen were not, however, motivated purely by mercenary ends.
Restoration of the lordship was an aspiration of many from the forfeiture of 1493 until the mid-seventeenth century. 130 This was more than just nostalgia for a supposed golden age. It was a very real expression of the grievances of the Islesmen. The only extant contemporary source from the region, was written by Donald Monro, a priest at Snizort, in Skye, in 1526 and then rector of Briagh na h-Aoidhe, near Stornoway, in the late 1540s. Monro's account was the first to refer to the council of the Isles which is assumed to have met at Finlaggan. The fourteen members of the council supposedly 'decernit, decreitit and gave suits furth upon all debaitable matters according to the Laws', even if the 'Lord were at his hunting or at ony uther games'. 131 Considering the correlation between the signatories of the 'Ellencarne' commission of 28 July 1545 and the council described by Monro, it has been suggested that Monro revealed less about how the lordship operated during the fifteenth century and more about the realities of the mid-sixteenth century; Monro's council comprised 'the leaders of Hebridean kindreds, mindful and jealous of their own status, rights and privileges'. 132 He described how these Islesmen had governed the region since the forfeiture: 'thair was great peace and welth in the Iles throw the ministration of justice'. This peace, wealth and justice had been maintained despite more intensive crown intervention after 1493. James IV had enacted legislation to ensure the observance of Scots law in the Isles; successive earls of Argyll and Huntly had been used to enforce government policy; and there had been consistent efforts to maximise crown revenues in the region. 134 All of this came without representation. The 'Ellencarne' signatories were, therefore, a disaffected 'political community', supporting Donald Dubh's rising because it offered an opportunity to express grievance at a time when such actions were not, as they asserted, a rebellion against the Scottish crown. 135 That the rebellion of the Islesmen was aimed at the minority government and the earl of Argyll in particular was oft reiterated, as was the assertion that the Islesmen remained loyal subjects of the Scottish crown. O'Neill claimed that Argyll was Donald Dubh's 'mortal enemy' and Donald's own letters emphasised that the Islesmen had consistently opposed 'enemies to the realm of Scotland'. 136 In their final agreement with Henry the Islesmen were engaged specifically against Huntly and Argyll. This is understandable from an English perspective, as keeping Argyll and Huntly occupied on their estates in the south-west and northeast respectively would be advantageous for the English army on the Borders. 137 It is less clear why Argyll was singled out by Donald Dubh. The Campbells of Argyll were not the hated figures they would become a century later.
Criticism of Argyll echoed John Elder's letter to Henry VIII of 1542/3. Elder's aim was, however, to distinguish Argyll from other 'valiaunt Yrishe lordes of Scotland'. 138 Subsequently, Argyll's role in government, his refusal to join with the pro-English party, his kinship ties to Arran and his decision not to join Gaels in the west combined to ensure that he became the main focus for resentment on the part of those in rebellion. Still, the western Highlands and Isles were not homogenous and Argyll was not alone in his refusal to rebel. While the chiefs of most lordship clans supported the rising, James MacDonald of Dunivaig and the Glens was non-committal, even although he assumed leadership of the movement, without any great success, following Donald Dubh's death. 139 While Donald had his own agenda, it is likely that other Highland chiefs carried personal ambitions too. Lordship restoration provided only a fragile unity and individual concerns with land and local, rather than national, issues, was evident amongst the lords of the south-west too. 140 Several lords of the south-west had allied with Henry because they genuinely supported closer union with England through the marriage of Mary and Edward. Some, like Huntly, opposed Henry because they were committed to the catholic cause and did not want to see protestantism encouraged in Scotland. Religious views did not always shape political allegiances. Although Argyll was catholic, his loyalty to the Arran administration derived from close kinship ties with the regent, a desire to protect Campbell estates and a concern to defend wider Scottish interests in the face of English aggression. Lennox, also catholic (despite his promises of conversion to protestantism in 1544), allied with Henry because of self-interest. 141 His personal ambitions in Scotland were thwarted by Arran's appointment as governor and, alienated from the French king, Lennox trod the well-worn path to London taken by many disgruntled Scots. Self-interest remained a powerful force.
It has been argued that 'the Scottish nobles . . . in the long run . . . were true to Scottish interests. The spirit of nationality was more powerful than the disintegrating forces of selfishness.' 142 But this view is hard to sustain in the face of such factionalism and vacillation on the part of those involved. For example, Archibald Douglas, sixth earl of Angus, who had been driven into exile by James V in 1529, signed a contract in 1532 recognising Henry VIII as supreme lord of Scotland. A long-term ally of the English king, he supported dynastic union through marriage but changed to support the Scottish side late in 1544 and continued this attachment until his death. No doubt his switch was encouraged by the remissions which Mary of Guise granted to several earls, including Cassillis and Glencairn, as well as Angus, in November 1544. Ultimately, however, Angus's move was motivated by his desire to protect his interests in the south-west: alliance with the winning side was the surest way to achieve this. 143 Glencairn supported Henry's campaign because he favoured religious reform but he changed sides constantly, eventually dying a pensioner of France in March 1548. 144 While a developing sense of national identity can be detected throughout this period, identity remained multi-faceted, conditioned by political, religious, regional, dynastic and personal factors, as well as by nationalism. 145 Henry's efforts to conquer Scotland had the potential to redraw the political map of Britain and Ireland. Rather than indulge in counterfactual speculations, we can, however, best understand his failure by analysing the origin of his quest. The Henrician Reformation had resulted in a complete realignment of English foreign policy. While Henry had been troubled by unrest in Ireland before the 1530s, he could no longer afford to let it rumble on. Foreign, catholic intervention in Ireland posed a direct threat to England's security. On his northern border Henry had tolerated his nephew, James V, interfering in his new Irish kingdom and growing in stature on the European stage, even although other European powers sought to use James in order to irritate the English king. 146 After James's death, Arran's flirtation with protestantism was promising but short-lived. The denunciation of the treaties of Greenwich and Arran's reconciliation with Beaton meant a catholic Scotland continued to pose a threat to the English king. The invasion that followed was not simply an attempt to persuade the Scots forcibly into agreeing to the dynastic union. It was also, in accordance with tradition, intended to secure England's northern border. 147 It was set against this wider imperative that Henry recognized the importance of the west, and the Firth of Clyde and Dumbarton Castle in particular. He received regular reports of French shipping sailing through the Irish Sea and Clyde estuary and realized the potential for attacking Scotland from the west. 148 Through negotiation and circumstance Henry gathered allies in the west, who possessed knowledge of tides and navigation and who could provide substantial military and maritime support on both sides of the Clyde. The extent of his support in the west of Scotland explained Henry's belief that the west, Stirling and Leith were the keys to Scotland. But his western allies comprised various groups, motivated by different factors. Henry managed to bring this disparate force together in 1545 but he was an opportunist who at times needed encouragement to act. He did not have a well-formulated or carefully-planned archipelagic agenda and he had no coherent naval and military outlook. Although Henry arguably laid the foundations of English naval strength, his efforts were not the result of an 'instinctive appreciation of the importance of sea power' or, indeed, of any grand plan for English supremacy of the seas. They were born of necessity. 149 Indeed, it is doubtful if Henry fully thought through the implications of co-ordinating his forces in the three kingdoms and he did not try to exploit the full maritime power of the western Isles. He allowed the opportunity of 1545 to slip through his fingers because he thought in terms of a land war, using naval forces simply to transport men and supplies, and because there were weightier distractions on the continent. Unable to give Scotland his full attention, Henry was slow to harness support, causing some to waver in their loyalty and others to change sides. His lack of strategic planning explains why his force disintegrated at a crucial moment. He failed to see that such a force would readily default to local and regional concerns regarding land and self-preservation if momentum was not maintained. 
